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Rethinking the modernity of Bernanos: a Girardian perspective 
Abstract 
The critical consensus about the modernity of Georges Bernanos’s political writings is too 
dependent on hegemonic social and cultural theories. While Pierrette Renard’s long essay on 
Bernanos rightly identifies his stylistic modernity, it wrongly depicts his polemical work as a 
search for nostalgic analgesia and as a statement of quasi-Nietzschean revolt. Sven Storelv’s 
attempt to reread Bernanos’s polemical works by relating them to the Book of Revelation is 
not substantiated by his evidence, but still highlights key Bernanosian themes which can be 
found systematically related in the theoretical oeuvre of René Girard. Analysis of Bernanos’s 
Scandale de la vérité, Nous autres Français and Les Enfants humiliés in this light reveals in 
fact the links that Bernanos makes between imitation, desire, possessiveness and violence, 
and the myths that are generated to hide this process. 
 
Key words 
Bernanos, Girard, modernity, desire, violence, myth  
2 
 
Since the 1990s there has been a broad critical consensus that the polemical writings of 
Georges Bernanos are paradoxically modern in substance and style. In his essay on Les 
Grands Cimetières sous la lune (1938), Bernanos’s tract about the Spanish Civil War, Michel 
Estève (1994) underlines how Bernanos’s dissent from the textbook Catholic response to the 
war was evidence of his affirming the primacy of conscience over ideology. Pierrette Renard 
(1998) has mounted the most complex and detailed argument in the secondary literature to 
demonstrate how Bernanos, in his polemical writings, was a moderne malgré lui. Most 
recently, Claire Daudin has sustained this critical tradition, arguing in Dieu a-t-il besoin de 
l’écrivain? (2009) that Bernanos’s personal faith bespeaks no corporate allegiance to the 
Church. In keeping with the view that resistance to modernity is another manifestation of 
modernity, Bernanos has also been classed as one of the anarchistes de droite (Richard, 
1988), alongside the likes of Léon Bloy or Louis-Ferdinand Céline. This approach depicts 
Bernanos as a child of the Belle Epoque who shared the violent scepticism of the anti-
Enlightenment about the Republican political project, but ploughed his own furrow in 
reacting against it. The work of all these critics is serious, profound and extensive. Moreover, 
a rapid survey of Bernanos’s polemical writings, particularly from 1936 onwards, appears to 
corroborate their conclusions, especially when we consider how much Bernanos speaks about 
l’homme libre, or the extent to which he distances himself from the torchbearers of the anti-
Enlightement in the period of l’entre-deux-guerres, with the persistent exception of Edouard 
Drumont.  
Still, even if the concept of Bernanos’s modernity allows us to account for certain 
aspects of his writing, its counter-intuitive nature gives rise to the suspicion that its motives 
are far from disinterested. In spite of what critics have asserted about his pertinence to the 
young, there is no particular proclivity among French youth for the works or the views of 
Bernanos. Indeed, since French youth has shown itself persistently deaf to Bernanos’s 
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repeated appeals to its untainted idealism, and since many of the disputes in which Bernanos 
was involved are now long dead, one may legitimately wonder whether the critical framing of 
Bernanos as moderne is an attempt to proof his work against its creeping irrelevance. 
Otherwise, such rebranding smacks of a kind of well-intentioned but ideologically inspired 
gerrymandering to ensure clear ground appears between him and the accursed torchbearers of 
the anti-Lumières. Bernanos is one of us; he couldn’t be one of them. 
The starting point of this present investigation is that such an agenda of ideological 
sanitisation, combined with critical overdependence on the discourses of hegemonic social 
theory, has occluded important dynamics within Bernanos’s political writings. Both have, for 
example, tended to obscure the fact that Bernanos’s attacks on Franco’s Spain or on the 
French right of the late 1930s, are rooted in an aversion to violently imposed social unity 
which also lies, paradoxically, at the root of Bernanos’s contempt for contractual or 
democratic politics. They have likewise narrowed criticism’s account of the paradoxes of 
Bernanos’s Les Grands Cimetières sous la lune in which Bernanos, the right-wing Catholic 
and monarchist, embraces a modern conceptualisation of freedom – a position that this author 
has hitherto argued (Sudlow, 2003) – by taking sides against the nationalists during the 
Spanish Civil War  
Now, it is also counter-intuitive to qualify contractual models of society as violent. 
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why it is pertinent to a discussion of Bernanos’s 
polemical writings. First, as one who deprecates Enlightenment individualism, Bernanos 
deplores the radical autonomy of subjects who, from a contractual perspective, form a unity 
which can be coerced by the will of the majority. Bernanos’s resistance to the democratic will 
cannot thus simply be reduced to the effects of extreme individualism. It is this paradox that 
descriptions of Bernanos as anarchist fail to account for. Second, as a moralist, Bernanos 
constantly eschews the appeal to abstract notions such as freedom of conscience, and engages 
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instead in a process of myth-deconstruction by attacking the coercive agendas which political 
discourses of all shades seek to veil. Corralling Bernanos’s analyses within the vocabulary of 
abstract moral discourse thus proves an obstacle to understanding the imaginative 
sensibilities and iconoclastic insights which underpin his frequent jeremiads. Those who 
plead in favour of a Bernanos moderne do so, therefore, at the cost of these distinctions. 
Given these reservations about existing interpretations of Bernanos’s political 
writings, the aim of this chapter is to challenge and enrich critical approaches to Bernanos’s 
polemical work. To this end, it will first explore and assess in greater detail the widely 
accepted arguments in favour of the modernity of Bernanos’s political writings. Then it will 
address Sven Storelv’s analysis of Bernanos’s polemical writings which breaks with the 
consensus that tries to define them in relation to modernity. Lastly, this chapter will consider 
the extent to which René Girard’s mimetic theory provides a more useful tool than these 
other methods for understanding Bernanos’s many complexities as an observer of French 
political life between the wars. For the purposes of this chapter, with its exploratory aims and 
its limited space, soundings of Bernanos’s political writings will be restricted to Scandale de 
la vérité, Nous autres Français and Les Enfants humiliés, three tracts written after the 
Spanish Civil War but before the Blitzkrieg which the Germans launched against France in 
spring 1940. Forming a loose trilogy – ‘trois oeuvres d’un seul tenant’, as Jacqus Chabot has 
observed (1971: 536) – these texts represent the state of Bernanos’s political témoignage on 
the eve of France’s crushing defeat. 
Prima facie, Girard’s mimetic theory, which focuses on the relationship between 
desire, deceit and violence in literary, cultural, political and religious contexts, appears 
eminently suitable to rereading the writings of Bernanos, a figure often characterised as 
temperamentally violent, and who was preoccupied with violence throughout his writing 
career. This chapter will argue, however, that rather than being a pure agent of violence, 
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Bernanos belongs to that tradition of writers who, according to Girard (1961; 1972; 1982), 
expose the illusions and myths which veil mimetic desire and the violence it can unleash on 
the individual and societal levels. Thus this chapter will aim to resituate Bernanos’s apparent 
anarchism and his belated disdain for Counter-Enlightenment figures in the context of his 
engagement with moral and cultural dynamics which would later become central to Girard’s 
mimetic theory. In corroboration of our findings, we will also consider in the course of the 
analysis how Girard’s last work, Achever Clausewitz (2007), strangely echoes some of the 
predictions of uncontrollable violence to be found in Bernanos’s tracts. For it seems that what 
Girard has identified as an apocalyptic escalation of violence — la montée aux extrêmes — 
was heralded already by Bernanos, caught between the horrors he witnessed in Majorca and 
the coming world war. 
 
Renard’s Bernanos moderne and Storelv’s Bernanos prophète 
The analysis and assessment of two key approaches to Bernanos’s polemics will serve as a 
launching point for developing a new critical framework. The first approach is found in 
Renard’s essay on Bernanos’s modernity which stands as an exemplar of the critical 
consensus noted at the beginning of this article. The second is found in two essays by Sven 
Storelv who, by using the imagery of the Book of Revelation as a basis for his commentary on 
Bernanos’s Essais et écrits de combat I, already foreshadows the Girardian analysis of 
Bernanos’s polemical writings which this chapter will aim to elaborate further on. 
 
Renard 
Renard’s essay in Etudes bernanosiennes 21 puts before us three principal arguments to 
sustain the critical depiction of Bernanos’s modernity. First, Renard argues that his sense of 
the liquidation of the past and the disorientation this induces are signs that he feels the 
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modern impossibility of integrating experience and knowledge (Renard, 1998: 82); second, 
she asserts that since Bernanos sees this disintegration as a negative thing, he assumes a 
constant attitude of combat against it, whence the habitual violence of his rhetoric, or his call 
to youth for a chivalrous ralliement, or his definition of prayer as revolt (Renard, 1998: 121); 
and third, she observes that Bernanos’s modernity is further confirmed by his témoignage, the 
literary form that his combat assumes (Renard, 1998: 123-128). This is manifested, for 
Renard, in the freedom of criticism he exercises against the Church, and then in the blending 
of fiction and history in his last polemical works which, again according to Renard, show him 
retreating into a kind of subjective enclave to comment on events (Renard, 1998: 139). 
Renard’s Bernanos finally embraces a kind of autonomy and interiority, and thus 
incoherently –though Renard would no doubt prefer paradoxically – Bernanos launches his 
attacks on modernity from the vantage point that modern subjectivity provides him with. 
Despite the textual evidence which Renard marshals in favour of these arguments, 
they are problematic on several levels. The first argument alludes to the view which treats 
nostalgia as a manifestation of modern sensibility in flight from present incomprehension, a 
view also articulated by David Lowenthal (1985). Yet this is unconvincing in the case of 
Bernanos who finds experience and knowledge difficult to reconcile but not impossible. 
Indeed, since he is firmly convinced that their reconciliation can be found at the highpoint of 
Chrétienté in the Middle Ages, his analysis of modernity does not plunge itself into the past 
by way of analgesic nostalgia, but rather by way of preparing the past’s retrieval. In this 
respect a second problem with Renard’s analysis concerns its assumption that the retrieval of 
the past can only be an exercise in nostalgia pitched against the exorable linearity of time. It 
can be argued, however, that writers whose imaginative formation has been liturgical and 
sacramental (Greeley, 2001) — and this was indeed the case for Bernanos not only as a 
Catholic but as a pupil in a minor seminary during the early years of the liturgical movement 
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in France — envisage the past in ways that are meta-chronological because ultimately 
eschatological. Renard’s implication that Bernanos’s call for a renewal of the chevalerie de la 
Chrétienté is a nostalgic and pantomimic performance, undertaken to counter his 
disorientation, thus fails to consider how the liturgy, a central process in the formation of 
Catholic sensibility and imagination, could provide a model for the imaginative 
reactualisation in the present of something that happened in the past. 
Renard’s second argument about Bernanos’s combat as the response to his modern 
disorientation also poses problems. Renard claims that Bernanos forms part of the tradition 
whose fulminating heralds include Baudelaire and Nietzsche, and which condemns the world 
— Renard recapitulates Nietzsche’s words — as ‘impie, immoral, inhumain’ (Renard, 1998: 
76). Yet we would be mistaken if we failed to appreciate in Bernanos’s rhetoric against his 
enemies the wounding of a more fundamental desire for reconciliation. Bernanos’s well-
known inclination to fall out with his contemporaries was countered by an instinctive 
readiness to bury the hatchet, as he did with Jacques Maritain (though not successfully with 
Charles Maurras). Given Bernanos’s literary filiation to Léon Bloy, in both theme and 
language (Milner, 1967: 55), Bernanos’s fulminations against his enemies can arguably be 
read in the light of Bloy’s conclusion to his own Exegèse des lieux communs which, after 
excoriating all the axioms of bourgeois sensibility, concludes with this disarming appeal:  ‘Il 
faudrait pourtant y songer, pauvre imbécile, et en y songeant, s’arrêter un peu d’être stupide 
et de faire souffrir les malheureux. Car nous sommes cela, toi et moi, et rien que cela, des 
abîmes!’ (p. 306). The combat of Bernanos and Bloy is not a revolt against perpetual 
incomprehension, or a statement of never-ending hostility, but most often a corollary of their 
belief in the possibility of eventual reconciliation. ‘A la douce pitié de Dieu’, Bernanos writes 
to Maurras in his last letter to him on 21 May 1932 (1971: 1258) since for Bernanos there is 
reconciliation in no other locus. To return to the theme of combat, while it is also true that 
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Bernanos defines prayer as revolt – ‘la seule révolte qui se [tient] debout’ (1971 [1938]: 364) 
– we would be mistaken to assume that this is simply an affirmation of raw human agency or 
a spiritual variation on what was fundamentally a political agenda. Bernanosian prayer stands 
upright because it is a theocentric movement. Indeed, it is only when the prayer of 
Bernanos’s fictional saints renounces anthropocentrism and the maximalisation of human 
agency that it can avoid being disintegrating; as the last page of the Journal d’un curé de 
campagne notes, ‘il est plus facile que l’on croit de se haïr; la grace est de s’oublier’ 
(Bernanos, 1961 [1936], 1258).  
Renard’s view that the increasing interiority of Bernanos’s works is a sign of 
modernity is much better founded, though lacking in certain essential nuances. In the 
polemical works, especially the late ones, Bernanos’ témoignage is certainly marked by the 
predominance of ‘[le] regard, le role de l’expérience, l’importance du present et de la raison, 
l’utilisation, en fait, de la méthode des Lumières’ (Renard, 1998: 139). Yet here, Renard 
arrives at her conclusion – la methode des Lumières – with undue haste. The tendencies 
which she identifies in Bernanos’s writings might equally be clarified by drawing on Charles 
Taylor’s distinction between the ‘porous’ and the ‘buffered individual’. In his monumental 
opus A Secular Age (2007: 37-41) Taylor posits a distinction between the pre-modern 
individual, who is porous with respect to the meaning and purpose of the world insofar as 
they are exogenous to his consciousness; and the buffered individual, who constructs that 
meaning and purpose from the inside out or endogenously. Still, Taylor maintains, there is a 
porous or open version of buffered individuality – an open immanence – which, while 
conscious of its own psychological egocentricity, is open to an exogenously located meaning 
and purpose in a world created by a divine subject. This latter kind of interiority, if it is 
buffered in its internal dynamics, is nevertheless porous in its fundamental assumptions. 
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While Bernanos, therefore, retreats further and further inside himself in his polemical 
works, mixing historical commentary with fictional or even fable-like representations of 
moral questions, why should we conclude that he is embracing les Lumières given that he 
remains nevertheless convinced of, and attached to, a world of universally valid meanings 
and purposes which only porosity to the divine make available to him? After all, in spite of 
his great rage at injustice and weakness among the clergy, Bernanos does not become a 
religious sceptic. Neither does he adopt an anthropocentric view of the problems that beset 
the public arena; on the contrary Bernanos constantly answers the question of humanity by 
posing again and again the question of God. It is in fact only his belief in some universally 
valid reality beyond the material world that makes it possible for Bernanos to s’oublier, to 
forget himself. Now, this is of critical importance since it demonstrates that Bernanos’s 
coordinates are not simply those required by the need to contest the modernity that surrounds 
him. There is all the difference in the world – and not simply a difference à rebours – 
between ineluctable immanence and an immanence open to that which is without. If this is la 
methode des Lumières, then it is – pace Renard – strangely hostile to the scepticism and 
unbelief that the Lumières intended to herald.  
Renard’s view of Bernanos’s modernity appears to be influenced by an 
overdependence on hegemonic social and cultural theories, as do the views of other 
likeminded critics. For her, it is necessary to locate Bernanos on this terrain of the Lumières, 
even when such conclusions run counter to what we know to have been Bernanos’s most 
enduring tendencies. Even if, to the extent that his thinking displays the characteristics of 
Taylorian open immanence, we recognise Bernanos’s stylistic tendencies as modern, we can 
still ask whether Renard coherently frames Bernanos’s work by making it so utterly 
dependent on the very ideological hegemony which he deplored. While such an analysis 
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could account for the reactionary characteristics of Bernanos’s polemical work, it appears to 
end in a paradox which is itself more stylistic than substantive. 
 
Storelv 
A more convincing account of Bernanos’s political works, and one which dissents from the 
consensus about his modernity, can be found in the work of Norwegian critic Sven Storelv. In 
his essays ‘Remarques sur le mythe du déclin du monde’ (1993 [1972]) and ‘Bernanos, 
Discours pamphlétaire et discours apocalyptique’ (1993 [1987]), Storelv argues that analysis 
of the Essais et écrits de combat I, the first volume of the Pléiade edition of Bernanos’s 
political writings, could usefully begin by considering Bernanos’s imaginative preoccupation 
with les puissances du Mal. This preoccupation, which is sometimes advanced as a reason to 
classify Bernanos’s view of evil as Manichean, is attributed by Storelv to the influence of The 
Book of Revelation on Bernanos’s thought. In the first of these essays Storelv criticises 
Magdalena Padberg’s thesis Das Romanwerk von Georges Bernanos als Vision des 
Untergangs, which, he says, obscures the prophetic character of Bernanos’s fictional work by 
restricting the meaning of myth to pure fable. By way of developing a prophetic reading of 
Bernanos’s fictional work, Storelv then develops the parallels between it and the Book of 
Revelation, notably with regard to its imagery of the natural world, the signs of coming 
destruction and the demonic (1993 [1972]): 128).  
His conclusion that Bernanos appropriates the language and themes of the biblical 
prophetical tradition is furthered in his second essay ‘Bernanos, Discours pamphlétaire et 
discours apocalyptique’ (1993 [1987]), in which he develops two pieces of evidence to 
corroborate the parallels between Bernanos’s writings and the Book of Revelation. The first is 
Bernanos’s favoured depiction of the devil as the ape of God, the imitator or mimic, whose 
mimesis of the divine is an invitation to idolatry, and an explanation of the devil’s hostility to 
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God. The second is the subsequent impostures by which this hostility is concealed. These two 
beasts —idolatry and imposture — are, according to Storelv, the very puissances du Mal that 
Bernanos never ceases to denounce. For Storelv, therefore, it is not modernity or the 
Lumières which allow us to account for the paradoxes and power of Bernanos’s polemical 
writings. Rather, it is the nexus of idolatry and imposture, derived from the Book of 
Revelation, which is ‘le noyau de base irradiant qui règle le jeu des significations de tous les 
écrits de combat’ (Storelv, 1993 [1987]: 151).  
While Storelv’s analysis is stimulating, and certainly not dependent on a counter-
intuitive classification of Bernanos as moderne, textual evidence for Bernanos’s reliance on 
the Book of Revelation is not abundant. In the first of these essays, Storelv provides only one 
substantial textual reference from the Book of Revelation (referring to Chapter 13 and the two 
beasts), and in the second essay there are none. Storelv also appears to depict the biblical 
prophetic tradition as unproblematic, even though the Book of Revelation is a notoriously 
dense and multilayered text which has posed many problems for biblical hermeneutics 
(Callows, Kovacs and Rowland, 2004: 13-38). The centrality Storelv accords to The Book of 
Revelation in Bernanos’s imagination also leads to its own hermeneutic problems. In one 
instance he associates the image of the dragon, mentioned once in Nouvelle Histoire de 
Mouchette (1961 [1937]: 1276), with the dragon of Revelation, but ignores the fact that, for 
example, there are potentially far more classical than biblical sources for Jambe-de-Laine’s 
wild, snorting horse in Monsieur Ouine (1961 [1946]: 1360-1361).  
In spite of these issues, Storelv’s analysis provides fruitful categories in which to 
approach Bernanos’s work, especially given the recurrence of the problems of truth, deceit, 
masquerade and imitation in Bernanos’s polemical writings. Most importantly, Storelv’s 
analysis foregrounds not the thematic preoccupations of Bernanos’s writing – unlike much 
Bernanosian criticism which has focused relentlessly on themes such as holiness, priesthood, 
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childhood or evil – but rather the discursive mechanisms which drive it forward. Now, if 
Storelv fails to root these dimensions of Bernanos’s writings convincingly in the Book of 
Revelation, they can in fact be found linked systemically in the later work of cultural 
anthropologist René Girard who conceptualises the processes of mimetic behaviour (with 
which we can associate idolatry and the monde à rebours) and myth (with which we can 
associate imposture) as key drivers of human conduct and human cohesion.  
The usefulness of a Girardian reading of Bernanos suggests itself immediately with 
respect to Renard’s claim that Bernanos’s attack on the Spanish nationalists and on the 
Church in Majorca was effectively a paradoxical statement of Bernanos’s belief in freedom 
of conscience. From a Girardian perspective we need reach no such conclusion. In Girardian 
anthropology, the cohesion of a community, regardless of culture, is always the result of a 
process in which the build up of violence, induced by duelling desires, is relieved through the 
persecution of a scapegoat who is both innocent (because it has done nothing wrong) and 
guilty (because its persecution can somehow forge cohesion anew). The contribution of 
Christianity to this process, says Girard (2007 [1978]), has been to declare the total innocence 
of the scapegoat, and to posit renunciation or love as the cure for duelling desires. Reread in 
this light, Bernanos’s preoccupation in Les Grands Cimetières sous la lune (which then hangs 
over Scandale de la vérité, Nous autres Français and Les Enfants humiliés) is not freedom of 
conscience or the emancipation of the individual — ethical principles of a world view which 
Bernanos found abhorrent in any case — so much as the relentless declaration of the 
innocence of those who were murdered by the Spanish nationalists in Majorca. Saving the 
honour of honour, Bernanos’s stated aim in Scandale de la vérité, is tied implicitly to his 
repeated attempts to save the innocence of the Majorcan innocents, and more tangibly, to 
denounce their persecutors and all the myths invented to disguise the latter’s guilt.  
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A Girardian Reading of Bernanos 
There is no immediate reason to label the declaration of innocence as a particularly Girardian 
instinct avant la lettre. After all, Bernanos’s concern with innocence made little difference to 
his obstinate lifelong anti-Dreyfusardism. Moreover, the stylistically violent polemics for 
which Bernanos would become well known, notably through Les Grands Cimetières sous la 
lune and his radio speeches during the Second World War, might from a Girardian 
perspective be thought to make him insensitive to the processes that generate and disguise 
violence.  
Quite the contrary is true, however. The Girardian resonances of Bernanos’s 
polemical writings are seen in his growing sensitivity, from the mid-1930s onwards, first, to 
the escalation of violence (a violence induced by imitation) and, second, to the power of 
myth. In Girardian theory violence emerges from the rivalry created by desire. For Girard 
(1962), desire is always something imitative. The desire of the subject is not a binary 
relationship with an object (as it was for the Romantic tradition), but arises by a kind of 
triangulation when the subject learns the desirability of the object from the desire of another 
subject or model for the same object. In primitive societies the rivalry and violence that grew 
out of these competing desires — and which would reach its crisis when the rivalry and not 
the object had become thematic — had to be controlled by various social mechanisms (such 
as taboos) but, argues Girard (1972), when these were no longer sufficient, primitive societies 
always chose some scapegoat as a kind of safety valve to purge themselves of the accrual of 
violent tension. To retain the advantages achieved by the persecution of the scapegoat, the 
community needed to be protected from the truth of its actions by the generation of myths, 
traces of which Girard finds across all the cultures which he studies. Myth thus completes the 
violent cycle of desire, rivalry and mimetic crisis and at the same time perpetuates it by 
declaring falsely the guilt of the scapegoat and hiding the crimes of those guilty of violence. 
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 The possibility of a Girardian reading of Bernanos’s polemical works in this chapter 
is made plausible by the correlations between the grandes axes of Girardian theory and the 
two poles of idolatry (denoting mimetism, rivalry and violence) and imposture, which Storelv 
identifies but does not ground adequately in his analysis. It is also rendered plausible by the 
critical work of Paul Delvaux (1988-89) who has long since pointed to tangible Girardian 
patterns in Bernanos’s fictional writings. The correlations between dynamics in Bernanos’s 
polemical writings and Girardian theory will be made clear in the analysis of Nous autres 
Français and Scandale de la vérité which follows. They will be corroborated but also brought 
into question by the subsequent analysis of Les Enfants humiliés, a text which contains all the 
elements Girard has identified as integral to the system of religious violence. Throughout, our 
findings will be illuminated by reference to Bernanos’s perception of the escalation of 
violence and Girard’s view, set out in Achever Clausewitz, that in the period of Western 
secularisation, when pagan and Christian mechanisms to control violence (respectively 
scapegoating, and renunciation and forgiveness) are much less readily available, there is 
bound to be a montée aux extrêmes in humanity’s performance of violent rivalry. Indeed this 
was one of Bernanos’s greatest preoccupations on the eve of the Second World War; 
knowing the capacity of humanity for violent rivalry, he feared the kind of war which modern 
humans would wage on each other. The implications of this montée are, however, apparent 
first in Bernanos’s treatment of violence and of myth.  
 
Violence and the ‘montée aux extrêmes’ 
The composition of Nous autres Français was interrupted by that of Scandale de la vérité 
which was subsequently published first. Nous autres Français, like Scandale de la vérité and 
Les Enfants humiliés, is a series of reflections following no grand schema. A vague plan, 
nevertheless, emerges which sees the first four sections largely devoted to revisiting the 
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errors of Charles Maurras and Action Française, and the last two sections describing and 
rehearsing the providential prince whom the royalist Bernanos believed France needed in her 
hour of crisis. Within this tract, therefore, we are constantly confronted by the contrast 
between the values of honour and truth, which such a prince represents to Bernanos’s mind, 
and the violence and myth which he believes characterise the modern world and which are 
modelled by the Nazis and the Spanish Nationalists and epitomised by Maurrassian nostalgia. 
 To this end, for example, Bernanos distinguishes the violence of the Spanish 
nationalists or of the Nazis from his own arguably violent ideal of la chevalerie by noting 
their rage for conquest: ‘les Bêtes déchaîneés, rugissantes, marchent sur les hommes’ (1971 
[1939b]: 659-660). Their taste for conflict is, he says, the sign of a fratricidal fury whose 
aims are in fact proprietary (Bernanos, 1971 [1939b]: 632). In other words, they conquer in 
order to possess. Here Bernanos anticipates a key Girardian theme: that violence results from 
the unsatisfied desire of the subject for the object possessed by another.  
It is significant, therefore, in this regard that at the same time Bernanos denounces the 
unarmed ruse of the usurer against the poor as ‘la forme la plus efficace de la force’ 
(Bernanos, 1971 [1939b]: 633). Bernanos thus makes the link between the concupiscent 
pursuit of wealth (a key theme in his earlier tract La Grande Peur des bien-pensants) and the 
violence which it very often precipitates. While criticising the violence of totalitarianism, 
Bernanos maintains his contempt for the more subtle violence to be found under the 
conditions of political and economic liberalism. By corollary, Bernanos’s concern for le 
pauvre can be read as a plea for the scapegoats of capitalism, and as an indictment of 
materialist, democratic society which he denounces at length in the conclusion to La Grande 
Peur des bien-pensants (1931: 314-350). 
If such violence goes out in pursuit of the desirable, it emerges, for Bernanos, from 
the power of imitation. In the period before the Second World War, Bernanos’s fear was that 
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the French nationalists would rehearse against their compatriots, or against the Germans, the 
same insuperable pattern of hostility seen in Spain and which led to the themacity of violence 
in the crisis he witnessed in Majorca. Having once shared the anti-German discourse of the 
Right, he sees it now (without necessarily shedding it entirely) in relation to the violent ends 
which it serves: ‘Bien avant le racisme de M. Goebbels, la mystique antiallemande avait 
sournoisement favorisé chez nous le concept d’une race allemande, d’une race damnée, 
taillable et corvéable à merci, indigne de pardon (Bernanos, 1971 [1939b]: 713).’ Bernanos 
found in the rhetoric of the Right in 1939 a desire to see the Germans not merely defeated but 
made subject, and even excluded from reconciliation — indigne de pardon. In this respect 
Bernanos identifies the kind of oppressive rivalry which Girard will later class as that of 
‘monstrous doubles’. For Bernanos, at least in this case, the concept of race functions as a 
kind of mask which accords to one’s adversary a monstrous character (Girard, 2008 [1972]: 
248) and which justifies hostility against it. 
If we pursue this Girardian line, it is striking that Girard’s last book Achever 
Clausewitz sets out insights into violence which Bernanos again anticipates in Nous autres 
Français. The central thesis of Achever Clausewitz (2007: 62-64) is that without a scapegoat 
or without Christian renunciation, i.e. without the mechanisms which promise to solve violent 
tension, violence is likely to escalate inexorably in what Girard calls a montée aux extrêmes. 
Now Bernanos’s appreciation of the scapegoat mechanism is implicit rather than explicit — 
though it could be fruitful to look at figures like the two Mouchettes in that light — but in 
Nous autres Français he predicts this very escalation of violence in the context of the 
approaching war, especially in the minds of his erstwhile fellow militants from Action 
Française. The problem of Charles Maurras, says Bernanos, is that since he does not believe 
in the reign of God’s grace, he prefers what Bernanos calls the precept of realism: ‘Lorsque 
ton ennemi est étendu face contre terre, sans connaissance, ne perds pas l’occasion de lui 
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écraser la nuque à coups de batons’ (Bernanos, 1971 [1939b]: 713). Bernanos also notes 
Maurras’s inconsistency in criticising the violence of others while quite unconsciously 
advocating violence to achieve his own ends. Thus, while Maurras excoriated the Germans 
for their policy of total war, he also applauded the bombings of Madrid and Barcelona 
(Bernanos, 1971 [1939b]: 654).  
We will return to this process of self deception below since it is intrinsic to the myths 
that disguise violence. What is crucial here, however, is that, for Bernanos, the Maurrassian 
Right had lost the ability to draw a line in the sand between mercy and the iron law of justice, 
and thus had no means to oppose the mounting violence. From this perspective, the ironic 
rule of Action Française’s strategy for restoring the monarchy par tous les moyens, même 
légaux finds its logical outcome in a violent hostility which is no longer a means but now an 
end in itself. 
How did Bernanos come to perceive this danger of exponentially mounting violence? 
Precisely through his experience of the Spanish Civil War where he felt its logic had been 
played out perfectly. If we note that Maurras was ultimately in favour of Munich — surely 
evidence against the argument that Bernanos is pursuing — it is only right to point out his 
eagerness for rearmament against Germany before that time. We might label this 
opportunism rather than realism, but that aside, it is clear that Bernanos expected the very 
worst from the coming conflict, including the logical apogee of unbridled hostility in the 
kinds of extermination campaigns he had witnessed in Spain. There would be no easy limit 
on the coming violence; Bernanos thus foreshadows the Girardian montée aux extrêmes. 
 Storelv’s first beast of idolatry is redolent of the mimesis and possessiveness which 
Bernanos describes, but fails to capture fully the links which Bernanos perceives between 
desire, possessiveness and violent hostility to the adversary. For Bernanos, as for Girard, 
however, the driving force behind so many events is unregulated, imitative desire which 
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always threatens to explode into uncontrollable violence. That Bernanos is opposed to the 
violence of liberal capitalism and political totalitarianism shows that his position is better 
accounted for not in relation to Left and Right or in relation to modernity, but rather in 
relation to his perception of the moral links between desire, possession and violence. 
 
Myth 
Nous autres Français also foreshadows the link which Girard will later establish between 
violence and myth. As Bernanos observes, ‘Les mythes naissent sous les pas du réaliste, et 
cet imbécile a tort de s’en étonner, car ils viennent de lui […] A chaque nouvelle canaillerie 
des réalistes correspond un mythe qui n’est que la canaillerie elle-même (Bernanos, 1971 
[1939b]: 713-4)’ For Girard the purpose of myth is especially to mask the real sources of 
violence when exercised to create or recreate communal unity (1982). Still, by extension, 
myth is found everywhere in Girard’s system; Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque 
(1962) explores how the myth of romantic desire (insofar as it depends on a binary system of 
desiring subject and desired object) had been exposed by a canon of writers who perceived 
the triangulation of desire. What is key for Girard, however, is that where there is violence, 
there will always be a myth to disguise its root in mimetic desire.  
For Bernanos likewise the perpetrators or advocates of violence show signs of 
constantly needing the blanket of myth to conceal the sources of their action. Bernanos is so 
convinced of this that he concludes: ‘Le monde sera demain aux mythes’ (1971 [1939b]: 
718). Bernanos had always denounced, lies but here he perceives a montée des mythes 
corresponding to the montée aux extrêmes of violence. The application of this principle to 
Action Française, with all its characteristic violence, was also inevitable. In Nous autres 
Français, Bernanos remarks quite crushingly: ‘Le pays réel n’a pas de réalité’ (1971 [1939b]: 
675).  
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In thus denouncing one of Maurras’s favoured depictions of France — le pays réel of 
the monarchy as opposed to the pays légal of the Republic — Bernanos was only 
recapitulating the theme of his earlier tract Scandale de la vérité. This tract was originally 
conceived as a preface to an anthology of texts by Edouard Drumont compiled by Fr 
Raymond Bruckberger O.P. When the anthology’s publication fell through, however, the 
tract was reworked into publishable form for the Nouvelle Revue française where it appeared 
in April 1939. It was Bernanos’s first opportunity to speak at length about the 1938 Munich 
pact, about France’s part in it, and above all about the actions of Charles Maurras in 
welcoming the appeasement of Nazi Germany. For Bernanos, in contrast, the betrayal of 
France’s duty to Czechoslovakia represented a grave dishonour. Indeed, the denunciation of 
this crime was, according to Bernanos, the only truth which could pose a scandal to the post-
Munich mood of political pragmatism and narrow self-interest.   
The word scandal again has Girardian overtones (Girard, 2001) since what is 
scandalous breaks the illusions created by the myths that are needed to hide the violence of 
the community. Scandale de la vérité itself is an exercise in the relentless deconstruction of 
the myths which, Bernanos believed, were essential to the cause of the Maurrassian Right, as 
to the members of Action catholique and the French hierarchy. In a series of accusations 
Bernanos fingers their mythic impostures: they treat the temporal domain as if it were the 
spiritual and vice versa; justice, truth and honour have been used as a veil for self-interest 
such that their politique too often assumes the just garb of mystique; moreover, he denounces 
Action Française as an impostor of the true monarchical tradition (Bernanos, 1971 [1939a]: 
595-6). For Bernanos, myth seems as omnipresent as incipiently violent desire. 
From a Girardian perspective, it is again significant that Bernanos connects his 
deconstruction of these myths to the redemptive action of Christ who, for Girard (2007 
[1978]), exposes the great myth of the persecution of the scapegoat. As for Catholics who 
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would mythologize Christianity to serve political ends — arguably, the stock-in-trade of the 
counterrevolution — Bernanos demands that they stop using Christian revelation 
possessively as a tool to achieve their own purely human ends:  
 
‘Moi, je ne me lasserai pas de répéter à ces gens-là que la vérité ne leur appartient 
nullement, que la plus humble des vérités a été rachetée par le Christ, qu’à l’égal de 
n’importe lequel d’entre nous, chrétiens, elle a part à la divinité de Celui qui a daigné 
revêtir notre nature – consortes ejus divinitatis – entendez-vous, menteurs ?’ (1971 
[1939a]: 603). 
 
 Bernanos here condemns the kind of possessive proprietorship which Girard claims to be the 
root of all violent conduct, only in this case — and this is crucial — it is Christianity which is 
doubly sacrificed : first as an object deformed by ideological control, and then by the myth 
which disguises its manipulation.  
Perhaps in this instance we see the convergence of Bernanos’s concerns with 
escalating violence and escalating myth. The burden of Bernanos’s témoingage is to 
challenge his coreligionists and fellow travellers on the Right to embrace truth and renounce 
the manipulative and violent use of myth: as lies are to power, so truth is to honour, or so 
Bernanos instinctively felt. From this perspective, his attacks on the Church over Spain are 
less an expression of freedom of conscience — pace Estève — and more an allegation that 
Spanish churchmen have not been faithful to their charge. Thus, Bernanos seems to stand 
before the spectacle of France on the eve of the Second World War, saying — like Steeny 
glaring at his manipulative mother Michelle and Mademoiselle, her intrusive sidekick — 
‘Menteuse, menteuse’ (Bernanos, 1961 [1946]: 1351). 
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Sacrificial dynamics in Les Enfants humiliés 
As we have argued above, Nous autres Français and Scandale de la vérité can be read in the 
light of mimetic theory. Among its various themes Nous autres Français clearly rehearses the 
unfolding of violence inspired by desire, while Scandale de la vérité analyses how the violent 
generate myths in their defence. We have also argued that the correlations between 
Bernanos’s thought and mimetic theory point to the advantages of a Girardian reading of 
Bernanos’s polemical works when compared to the critical consensus represented by Renard 
(1998). 
 Now, these elements in Bernanos’s polemical writings, which anticipate so many of 
Girard’s reflections on the origins of violence and the use of myths, find an even more 
intense realisation in Les Enfants humiliés. Therein, Bernanos’s analysis of interwar France, 
its relations with it military veterans and its conduct towards Germany, depicts a cultural 
situation that has many correlations with Girard’s understanding of the sacrificial 
mechanisms within human culture. Yet, at the same time, Les Enfants humiliés points to a 
significant dissonance between Girard’s and Bernanos’s thinking. 
 Les Enfants humiliés, like its immediate predecessors, is a short tract with little formal 
organisation. It is essentially a reflective diary – it is given the subtitle of Journal 1939-1940 
– and brings to a head Bernanos’s thoughts about France’s situation after Munich and before 
the defeat of June 1940. The text was completed by April 1940 and dedicated to Bernanos’s 
Brazilian friends Mr and Mrs Virgilio de Mello Franco, but it was only published in 1949 a 
year after Bernanos’s death from cancer. Stylistically speaking, it corresponds to the 
immanent pattern which Renard (1998) rightly detects in the late Bernanos. And yet it sees a 
dialogue unfold between Bernanos and his own childhood – le petit enfant que je fus, to use 
his oft repeated expression – which in the contrast it draws between holy enfance and les 
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enfants humiliés is a rigorous exercise in the supernatural realism by which light Bernanos 
analysed all life, fictive or real.  
 The Girardian elements which emerge from Les Enfants humiliés are very distinct. 
First, Bernanos’s conviction was that France had been stolen from the French, principally by 
les clercs, the jurists and intellectuals, who had replaced the sentiment of ‘la patrie’ with the 
concept of ‘l’Etat’ (1971 [1949]: 811). The French people were, therefore, the victims of a 
violent privation before they even had a chance to realise the danger of the rivalry posed by 
this dangerous elite. Second, those responsible for this theft, alongside la classe dirigeante, 
appear to Bernanos as the constant aggressors of the French people. The context of the world 
wars – the memory of the first and the arrival of the second – leads Bernanos to label this 
group as l’Arrière and himself and his fellow veterans of World War One as l’Avant. 
Crucially, those who belong to l’Avant are destined to become the scapegoats of the incipient 
violence which l’Arrière has fomented in the first place. The Girardian overtones here are 
remarkable: 
 
Car ils savent bien, ils ont dans les moelles la plus veille des traditions religieuses 
humaines, ils n’ignorent pas que toute purification suppose une préalable expiation, et 
l’Arrière, sans oser le dire, attend de l’Avant qu’il expie (1971 [1949] : 792, my 
emphasis).  
 
This sacrificial understanding of the role of the veterans (and indeed of la jeunesse since 
Bernanos sees the veterans as the young generation who fought 1914-1918) reoccurs 
throughout the text; whatever happens, it is they who are made to be the scapegoats for the 
violent crimes committed by les clercs against France; and it is their deaths which help 
restore order, just as the death of the Girardian scapegoat restores harmony: 
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Sur la gigantesque machine à niveler les âmes, on a hissé le pavillon national, et tout 
ce qu’elle va moudre désormais de médiocrité sera mis au compte de la patrie, débité 
comme fourniture de guerre (Bernanos, 1971 [1949] : 799). 
 
Clearly, Bernanos’s understanding of l’Avant and l’Arrière and of the exploitation of the one 
by the other foreshadows Girard’s explanation of how primitive societies cope with the build-
up of internal violence. Instead of seeing in Bernanos’s division of the French people from 
the clerical elite a religiously inspired inflexion of class war theory, we would do better to 
appreciate how his description of France during this period adumbrates the various agents 
and processes which characterise Girard’s description of the persecution of the scapegoat 
(1982). 
The foreshadowing of the Girardian model of sacrifice is completed by Bernanos 
through his criticism of the false peace to which this process of expiation leads. In an 
extended passage on the nature of peace, Bernanos describes the false peace after the 
expiation of the scapegoat as a kind of lassitude, a state into which people are drawn when 
they are exhausted by their self indulgence (1971 [1949]: 838). Yet here also – it must clearly 
be recognised – the Girardian model is not as securely anticipated. The death of Girard’s 
scapegoat refounds societal harmony, even if the death is disguised in myth. For Bernanos, in 
contrast, this false peace after the expiation of the scapegoat is tangibly an act of imposture 
and compromise: it is more a ‘trêve’ than ‘la Paix’ (1971 [1949]: 837). If we were to explain 
this dissonance simply by attributing Bernanos’s perception of false peace to his sensitivity to 
myth, we would still fail to explain the almost miraculous power which Girard identifies in 
the scapegoating process to re-establish societal order.  Ultimately, of course, Girard is an 
anthropologist while Bernanos in his polemical writing is acting principally as a moralist. 
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Two further objections should be raised here to the correlations between Bernanos’s 
writing and mimetic theory in Les Enfants humiliés. First, surely Bernanos’s celebration of 
the veterans and his nostalgia for war run clear contrary to Girard’s aversion for violence and 
for the condemnation of violence in mimetic theory. Secondly, Girard’s thesis in Achever 
Clausewitz is that violence is bound to escalate in societies which have jettisoned ancient 
religious practices for controlling mimetic violence as well as the Christian solution thereto. 
In reply, it could be argued that Bernanos’s celebration of the veterans’ honour paradoxically 
tries to establish at least one value in society which cannot be instrumentalized or reified; one 
value which, in other words, cannot suffer the violation which mimetic desire would subject 
it to. Saving the honour of honour, especially perhaps when that honour has been sealed in 
self sacrifice, remains Bernanos’s agenda. Thereby, Bernanos declares invalid all attempts at 
illicit mimetic appropriation.  
In answer to the second objection just noted, it is curious that while Nous autres 
Français anticipated the violent montée aux extrêmes as described in Girard’s Achever 
Clausewitz, Les Enfants humiliés portray dynamics which Girard would associate with earlier 
cultural moments. While Bernanos sometimes uses the language of Clausewitz – he describes 
the wars of the modern state with the Clausewitzian expression ‘la guerre de tous contre tous’ 
(1971 [1949]: p. 805) – Les Enfants humiliés evokes what he himself terms ‘la plus veille des 
traditions religieuses humaines’. While Girard has come to believe that the ancient religions, 
as well as the Christian one, no longer provide a barrier to the escalation of violence, 
Bernanos seems instead to have arrived at the curious conclusion that the process of war itself 
can provide for modern France a quasi-religious catharsis. If this points to an undeniable 
divergence in their appreciation of cultural dynamics within modern France, what cannot be 
denied is Bernanos’s appreciation of the potential of violence in Nous autres Français or his 
understanding of the dynamics of imitation and their role in explaining the processes of 
25 
 
human society and culture. It is these processes, rather than any supposed modernity or 
concession to liberal ideology, which best explain Bernanos’s many paradoxes and his 
unquestionably complex polemical works. And it is indeed his very awareness of the power 
of mimesis which leads Bernanos (echoing St Jerome) to characterise Satan ultimately as ‘le 
singe de Dieu’ (1971 [1949]: 855). 
 
 
Reservations and conclusions 
There are a range of other objections that could be made to rereading Bernanos’s polemical 
works in a Girardian light. If we contest an analysis of his nostalgia for some far-removed 
Chrétienté — if for example we ask whether his understanding of the retrieval of the past 
should not be viewed as a form of eschatology — we must still concede that on his image of 
the Middle Ages he allowed himself to stencil anachronistically and perhaps unconsciously a 
person-centred view of freedom. Bernanos himself might have objected to a Girardian 
reading of his works, not least because he would have deprecated Girard’s early aversion to 
sacrifice in a Christian context (corrected under the influence of Raymund Schwager, 1987 
[1978]) and would surely have held in contempt Girard’s modernist tendency to make 
scripture say what he says it means; bizarrely, in Achever Clausewitz, a book purporting to 
define the Apocalyse, there is very little commentary on The Book of Revelation. It could be 
argued, furthermore, that Bernanos is guilty of his own violence and myth making, especially 
in his hounding of the Maurrassian vision of the world and in the way he constructs much of 
his understanding of the monarchical ideal.   
Still, his reason for this is rooted not in some paradoxical inflexion of enlightened 
individual autonomy, as Renard and Estève believe, but in his commitment to the defence of 
innocence, and in his sense that violence and myth sacrifice innocence and truth to power. 
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The interrelatedness of these themes can serve as a corrective to narrower readings of 
Bernanos which, for example, would foreground emphatically his role as témoin (Renard, 
1994) or his opposition to the modern world (Gosselin and Milner, 1989), arguably at the 
expense of their relation to this central nexus of Bernanosian themes. Most importantly, their 
interrelatedness challenges the portrayal of Bernanos as a modern, a portrayal too intent on 
plotting Bernanos’s coordinates against hegemonic social and cultural categories. Bernanos’s 
opposition to totalitarianism and his hatred of liberalism emerge from the same contempt he 
felt for the varying modes of their possessive aggression towards humanity, and the means by 
which the powers-that-be of all political stripes sought to veil it in myth.  
There is undoubtedly an interiority and subjectivity in Bernanos’s last political tracts 
which sustain a reading of Bernanos as a stylistic moderne.  Still, such a paradox has little to 
say about Bernanos’s substantive preoccupation with myth and violence and with his 
anticipation of the Girardian model of scapegoating in the context of modern France. When 
these preoccupations are considered, however, it is clear that in his polemical writings on the 
eve of the Second World War, Georges Bernanos discovers something which René Girard 
would later attempt to elucidate throughout his theoretical work: that the world can be more 
accurately interpreted not through its pretexts and justifications, but through its envies and its 
desires.   
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